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1. Introduction  
 
All over Europe new detention centres for immigrants are being or have been built in 
recent years (Gibney and Hansen 2003; Weber and Bowling 2004; Jesuit Refugee Service 
2005; Welch and Schuster 2005; Calavita 2005; De Giorgi 2006; Van Kalmthout et al. 
2007). In the United States as well, there has been a ‘surge in the numbers of 
undocumented immigrants incarcerated in county jails, federal prisons and immigration 
detention centers’ (Inda 2006: 116; see also Scalia 2002; Ellermann 2005; Amnesty 
International 2009). Australia also has a notable capacity to detain asylum seekers and 
illegal migrants (Burke 2008). In other words, detention of ‘unwanted’ migrants is 
increasingly part and parcel of the governmental regulation of international immigration. 
There are two main types of immigration detention (Hailbronner 2007; Cornellise 
2010): (1) pre-admission detention at the border involving foreigners not admitted to the 
state’s territory – in some countries this includes asylum seekers – and (2) pre-expulsion 
detention of foreigners whose stay in the territory is or has become unauthorized 
(hereafter: illegal migrants). This article primarily pertains to the second type of 
immigration detention. 
In most European countries, including the Netherlands, the detention of migrants 
for these migration-related reasons is defined as administrative detention, a detention 
modality that is formally not a punishment, and does not require a conviction for a crime. 
It is a matter of administrative and not criminal law. Although law stipulates that it be 
imposed in the interest of ‘public order and national safety’1, administrative immigration 
detention is defined as a non-punitive, bureaucratic measure that is meant to enable the 
enactment of border control: it merely ensures that ‘unwanted’ migrants can be located 
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and identified and cannot abscond while the expulsion is prepared (cf. Noll 1999: 268). 
Given this rationale, immigration law prescribes that confinement has to be annulled as 
soon as the migrant’s departure has been organised, or if an administrative judge decides 
that the chances of expulsion are too slim to justify continued detention.
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The question can be raised whether the formal policy framework for 
administrative immigration detention, in which detention is a non-punitive means to 
achieve the goal of removing unwanted migrants, constitutes a sufficient explanation for 
actual detention practices. In this paper we will be looking more closely at the case of the 
Netherlands where it appears that immigration detention serves informal social functions 
that are not codified in law. 
There are three main empirical observations in the Netherlands that warrant an 
examination of de facto functions of immigration detention. Firstly, since the early 1990s 
up to 2006, there has been a steady increase in the capacity and actual use of immigration 
detention, while the number of expulsions appears to have been going down. It was only 
after 2006 that detention figures decreased somewhat, mostly as an indirect effect of the 
EU’s enlargements in 2004 and 2007, which legalised many Eastern European illegal 
migrants over night. Secondly, the average length of immigration detention in the 
Netherlands has increased over the years (Van Kalmthout and van Leeuwen 2004a, 
2004b). Thirdly, if expulsion procedures fail, immigrants are released from detention, 
back on the streets. In the informal lingo in the field of immigration detention this 
practice has become known as klinkeren - which roughly translates into ‘cobbling’, i.e. 
releasing somebody back onto the cobblestone streets. ‘Cobbled’ detainees are often re-
apprehended and detained again in case of continued illegal residence.
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 To these 
practically ‘undeportable deportable immigrants’, the detention system risks becoming a 
revolving door (Leerkes, 2009; Broeders 2009, 2010). 
Localisation, identification and documentation of illegal migrants are a sine qua 
non for their expulsion (Broeders, 2007; Ellermann, 2008). No country of origin accepts 
undocumented returnees. Identification with a view to (re-)documenting an illegal 
migrant, takes place during administrative detention. The observations above indicate that 
the immigration authorities have great difficulties with the identification of illegal 
migrants who are reluctant to be sent home, hide their legal identity and have destroyed 
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their papers (Broeders, 2010). Countries of origin too may be reluctant to co-operate with 
repatriation. The International Organization for Migration (2008: 94), for example, 
reported that Chinese who have stayed in Western Europe for a longer period of time, 
“are often not allowed back into China, as Chinese authorities fear that their experience 
of democracy may make them dangerous.” Thus, identification and compliance by 
countries of origin are the main bottlenecks of the expulsion procedure. 
Because of these apparent irrationalities from the perspective of the official legal 
framework – why increasingly invest in immigration detention, if it does not lead to more 
expulsions? – it is worthwhile to explore other explanations for the use of immigration 
detention. Certain ‘irrational’ practices may make sense for certain actors when looked at 
through a different lens. As has been said, these alternative perspectives are unlikely to be 
codified in law. What interests us here are immigration detention’s implicit or informal 
functions, i.e. the various de facto uses that it may have for relevant actors in this social 
field, such as national and local politicians, policymakers, policemen, immigration 
judges, and illegal migrants.  
There is an extensive scientific literature on the functions of penal detention (for 
overviews see Rycklak 1990; Garland 1991, Carlsmith and Darley 2002). This literature 
provided the ‘sensitizing concepts’ (Blumer 1954)) that helped us identify relevant 
informal functions of immigration detention. The study’s empirical basis consisted of 
policy documents, survey data, administrative data, and fieldwork in a Dutch centre for 
immigration detention. Empirical observation is crucial to avoid the fallacy of 
functionalism, i.e. the idea that practice Y must necessarily be functional for actor Z, 
given interest X, simply because Y can be expected to exert certain beneficial effects for 
X. It is desirable to demonstrate these effects empirically, for instance by showing that Z 
aimed for Y because of X (Levy 1968). 
To some extent our distinction between formal and informal functions of 
immigration detention resembles Robert Merton’s (1957) classic distinction between 
‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ functions. Yet, whereas Merton stressed the unintended nature of 
latent functions, we allow for the possibility that some informal functions of 
administrative detention may be intended by the actors in that social field – politicians, 
policymakers, policemen, immigration judges, illegal migrants – even if such motives are 
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not formalised in law. Thus, detention practices will be analysed “in relation to specific 
interests, specific social relations, and particular outcomes - bearing in mind what is 
‘functional’ from one point of view may be dysfunctional from another” (Garland 1991: 
126).       
In the next section we briefly describe the main functions of penal detention that 
emerge from the academic literature. We next describe the main characteristics of 
administrative immigration detention in the Netherlands. In the remainder of the article 
we explore three possible informal functions, and present some suggestive evidence for 
each. These alternatives are (1) deterring illegal residence, (2) controlling the negative 
external effects of (illegal migrant) pauperism and (3) asserting symbolical control over 
unwanted immigration with a view to upholding popular support and trust in national 
government. 
 
2. Functions of penal punishment 
 
The social scientific literature argues that, on the one hand, punishment is meant to 
reduce deviance. Or, to be more precise, it can be said that practices of punishment are 
functional for the ideology that punishment decreases deviance, as there is considerable 
scholarly disagreement on the effectiveness of punishment in reducing deviance. This 
instrumental or utilitarian function of punishment includes notions of deterrence 
(punishment and the threat of punishment inhibit crime), rehabilitation (prisons re-
socialize convicted offenders to prepare for their re-integration in society), and 
incapacitation (crime levels can be controlled by removing dangerous individuals from 
society). On the other hand, it is argued that punishment satisfies certain moral needs, 
regardless of its real or perceived effects on deviance levels. This expressive or 
deontological function of punishment includes notions of retribution (wrongdoers deserve 
punishment proportional to the moral wrong committed) and denunciation (law 
trespassers should be held up to the rest of society and denounced as violators of the rules 
that define what the society represents (cf. Rychlak 1990: 331)).  
 Admittedly, the functions mentioned are to some extent informal. For example, 
criminal law and penal law do not state that punishment is meant to deter or incapacitate. 
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Yet, contrary to administrative law, most of the functions mentioned are clearly implied 
in criminal and penal law, and are widely agreed upon in the legal and penal field.  
Many criminologists have noted and debated shifts in penal policies and practices 
concerning the functions of punishment. Under the headings of the ‘new penology’ 
(Feely and Simon 1992) and the ‘culture of control’ (Garland 2001) scholars have noted 
that ideals and practices of rehabilitation, which were central to penal practices during the 
1960s and 1970s, have gradually given way to stricter and harsher policies that place the 
emphasis on incapacitation. Even though these theories have also met with various 
critiques (see for example Matthews 2005; Cheliotis 2006; Reiner 2007) the shift from 
rehabilitation to a focus on incarceration remains a central hypothesis. One of the main 
indicators for this development has been the rising incarceration rates in Western Europe 
and North America (Feeley and Simon 1992; Wacquant 1999) 
Another claim of the new penology is that the net of the penal system has been 
cast wider. It has begun to target a wider range of ‘dangerous’ social groups apart from 
the individual criminal. Or, in the words of De Giorgi (2006: 106): ‘[i]t is not so much 
the individual characteristics of subjects that are the object of penal control, as instead 
those social factors which permit to assign some individuals to a peculiar risk-class.’ In 
this way, groups that formerly were in the care of the welfare state or private charities, 
such as the poor, welfare dependents, and drug addicts are increasingly coming into 
contact with the penal system. 
In this article we will go into the question of whether the development described 
by the new penology is relevant in the case of illegal migrants in the Netherlands, as 
administrative immigration detention only started in earnest in the early 1990s. This 
roughly coincides with the period in which the shift from rehabilitation to incapacitation 
is supposed to have occurred. We will also relate the other functions of punishment to 
immigration detention practices in the Netherlands. 
 
3. Immigration detention in the Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands, as in many other EU member states, expulsion policies have become 
more prominent in recent years. Even though expulsion remains in essence a solution of 
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last resort – voluntary departure is certainly preferred over expulsion – it has come to be 
regarded as the indispensable closing section of any serious restrictive immigration 
policy, which certainly characterises the Dutch policy with respect to non-EU nationals. 
In 2003 the Dutch White paper on Return even stated that ‘return policy should not be a 
closing section but rather an integral part of immigration policy itself’ (Minister voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2003: 5). 
In the majority of the EU countries, including the Netherlands, illegal residence 
is, in itself, not a criminal offence, meaning that there is no ground under criminal law for 
detention (for a legal study on immigration detention in Europe see Cornellise 2010). In a 
smaller group of EU countries
4
, including Germany, illegal residence is a criminal 
offence that is usually punishable with fines and detention (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 
64). Yet, even in Germany, immigration detention usually is administrative detention and 
does not take place under criminal law (Dünkel et al. 2007: 377).  
The legally allowed length of administrative detention in the Netherlands is long 
when compared to most other European countries. Whereas in some countries 
administrative immigration detention is a matter of days, Dutch law has no fixed duration 
(Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 59). In principle detention can be imposed until expulsion is 
realised or still remains a possibility. In light of the recent adoption of the European 
‘Returns Directive’, which stipulates that the maximum length of administrative 
detention shall not exceed 18 months, Dutch law will have to be adapted (Baldaccini 
2009). Considering that the maximum was set at 18 months, detention practice will not 
have to change much as detentions of that length are exceptional, although they do occur 
(Van Kalmthout & Hofstee-Van der Meulen 2007: 650). At present, roughly 75% of the 
total population is detained for less than three months (DJI 2008a: 13).   
 The legal framework for administrative detention has been translated into a 
detention practice that suggests that the Dutch authorities have great confidence in 
detention for the regulation of migration. During the 1990s the cell capacity for 
immigration detention has been greatly increased. While in 1980 there were 45 places 
available for the administrative detention (Van Kalmthout 2005) in 2007 the counter 
stopped at 3,807 places (DJI 2008b; see also figure 1). If we look at immigration 
detention as a percentage of the total prison capacity (i.e. excluding youth facilities and 
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enforced mental healthcare) the share of immigration detention has risen from 9.1% in 
1999 to 18.1% in 2006 (Broeders, 2009).  
The actual use of immigration detention has also become more prevalent in this 
period. On September 30
th
 1994, there were 425 administratively detained immigrants, 
against 2,555 on September 30
th
 2006. In this period, the annual number of 




[Figure 1 somewhere over here] 
 
Most detainees in the Netherlands are in pre-expulsion detention. Pre-admission 
detention is relatively uncommon: asylum seekers are housed in open reception centres 
spread across the country, and human smuggling is less of an issue than in countries 
bordering poorer non-Western countries. Almost all administratively detained immigrants 
are adults (>99%), about two thirds of whom are between 18 and 35 years of age. Men 
predominate (90%). Diversity in educational backgrounds is substantial: detention 
surveys held in 2004 and 2007 (see below) yielded the following distribution: 25% of the 
detainees had no formal education, 15% had primary education, 40% had secondary 
education and 25% reported having completed tertiary education. Thus, the share of the 
latter educational level was clearly elevated in comparison with regular prisons, which 
stood at 11% in 2007. These figures confirm that it is not only, and not even primarily, 
the poorest who migrate to Western countries (De Haas 2005). Diversity in nationalities 
is substantial as well: in 2009, according to Ministry of Justice registrations, the majority 
of the administratively detained immigrants were born in countries that, on their own, 
represented less than 5% of the detained population. The most prevalent country of birth 
was Somalia (12%).
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 This variation in national backgrounds resembles the diversity of 
the unauthorized population in the Netherlands, in which over two hundred nationalities 
are represented. This includes countries that have been a source of immigration for some 
time now (Morocco, Turkey, China and Surinam, a former colony), ‘new’ countries of 
labour migration to the Netherlands (Ukraine, India, Philippines), ‘asylum countries’ 
(Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan), and countries that play an important role on the 
international ‘spouse market’ (Brazil, Thailand, Russia) (Leerkes, 2009).  
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The increased use of immigration detention contrasts with the figures on 
expulsions, which appear to be on the downturn since the early 2000s. Perhaps tellingly, 
there is no official publication in the Netherlands reporting on expulsion trends. Thus, in 
order to create a time series, we had to ‘excavate’ relevant figures from various periodic 
reports by the Ministry of Justice. The results, depicted in Figure 1, indicate that the 
number of expulsions has been dropping since 2002, from a peak of 12,015 deportations 
in that year, to 6,150 deportations in 2007. 
There is additional evidence indicating that the Dutch authorities have great 
difficulty expelling detainees. According to Dutch Immigration Services (IND) statistics, 
immigration detention resulted in expulsion for 60.7% of all detainees in 2000 and for 
56.9% in 2001 (ACVZ 2002: 23). On the basis of his research among 400 immigrant 
detainees in 2003-2004 Van Kalmthout (2007: 101) claims the percentage of illegal 
migrants who are actually expelled is lower and may even be below 40%. 
Clearly, although the official rationale for administrative immigration detention 
explains part of detention practices – expulsions do certainly take place –, it does not give 
a full explanation of immigration detention practices. Given the persistence – and 
widening – of the gap between the large investments in immigration detention and the 
declining ‘proceeds’ thereof in terms of expulsions, the policy does seem to lack 
rationality. Therefore, other explanations for the practice of the administrative detention 
should be considered.        
 
4. Deterring illegal residence  
 
Although immigration detention is formally not a punishment, there are strong 
indications that detainees may experience it as a punishment nonetheless. It may even be 
hypothesised that administrative detention is meant to be experienced as a punishment, 
even if politicians and policymakers seldom state this intention explicitly.  
Other researchers have already asserted that administrative immigration detention 
is meant to bring about specific deterrence (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 53). In this view, 
the regime of administrative detention is intended to increase the pressure on detainees to 
leave the country and co-operate with the expulsion procedure, just like criminal 
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detention is intended to pressure criminals into law-abiding behaviour. We expand this 
view by proposing that immigration detention may also be intended as a form of general 
deterrence. In the latter sense, the perceived threat of administrative detention is meant to 
deter potential unwanted migrants from violating migration and residence laws, just like 
the threat of criminal detention is supposed to suppress criminal behaviour in the non-
criminal population.  
One important reason for the claim that Dutch immigration detention is intended 
to be punitive is that the regime is modelled after the model of voorlopige hechtenis, i.e. 
the detention regime for suspects of serious crimes who are put in custody while awaiting 
their trial. As a consequence, the administrative detainee has to undergo a similar extent 
of deprivation as suspected serious criminals, when it comes to opportunities to 
communicate with the outside world, work, daily routine, choice of food, et cetera.   
It could even be argued that administrative immigration detention is more of a 
punishment than staying in a regular prison, as the actual level of deprivation and degree 
of separation from local communities are probably higher in the former type of regime 
(with duration of stay held constant). For instance, although administratively detained 
immigrants have a right to be visited by family members or volunteers, they have no right 
to be visited without supervision, which, if it is considered beneficial for the 
rehabilitation of convicts, is allowed in some prisons. Furthermore, contrary to regular 
prisons, it is impossible to leave the immigration detention centre under supervision in 
order to attend important family events, such as attending the funeral of a direct family 
member. Moreover, in comparison with regular Dutch prisons, immigration detention 
centres in the Netherlands are characterised by a significantly lower level of facilities 
when it comes to work and schooling opportunities, sport facilities, and single person 
cells. All centres have some sporting facilities and some type of day program, but 
contrary to regular prisons, work opportunities are not always available. Also, it has been 
noted that there is often a relative lack of medical and legal aid, a risk of overcrowding, 
and fewer well-qualified staff (Dünkel et al. 2007; Van Kalmthout and Hofstee-Van der 
Meulen 2007). Given these differences, it is not surprising that a place in administrative 




It could be argued that the elevated level of deprivation in administrative 
detention in comparison to regular prisons follows from the formal policy framework and 
cannot be taken as an indication that immigration detention is used for deterrence 
purposes. It could be argued, for example, that the relative lack of work and study 
opportunities in administrative detention is consistent with the objective to expel the 
detainee: the illegal migrant is, by definition, not supposed to re-integrate in regular 
Dutch society. 
However, there is ample evidence that politicians and policymakers do use 
administrative detention for deterrence purposes. For example, Mr Nawijn, a former 
Dutch Minister of Aliens Affairs and Integration
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, referred to this function explicitly 
when the Dutch parliament discussed the Ministry of Justice’s budget for 2003, which 
included an increased budget for tracing and detaining illegal migrants: “The 
intensification of Aliens Surveillance will work from two sides. Because of the actual 
surveillance, when illegals are found and then removed, the number of illegals will 
decrease [AL/DB: here Mr. Nawijn refers to the formal function of immigration 
detention]. Furthermore, the realisation that there are more intensive controls -and that, 
therefore, the apprehension chance is increased- will have a deterrent and, therefore, 
preventive effect [AL/DB: here Nawijn hints at the informal general deterrence function 
we hypothesise, even if he does not speak of detention as such].”  (Tweede Kamer 2002: 
142; emphasis added). 
There is one further indication that national politicians and policymakers became 
increasingly motivated in the late 1990s and early 2000s to use criminal law and the 
threat of detention to deter unwanted immigrants from the Netherlands: since 2000 in 
particular, there has been a marked increase in ‘undesirable aliens’ resolutions in the 
Netherlands. An illegal migrant who is apprehended repeatedly for illegal residence, or 
who has been convicted of certain crimes, can be declared an undesirable alien by The 
Ministry of Justice (legal migrants can also be declared undesirable aliens on the latter 
ground). Continued residence in the Netherlands as an undesirable alien is then regarded 
as a crime against the state, which can be punished with six months of imprisonment 
(usually three months). The annual number of undesirable aliens resolutions increased 
from 845 in 2001 to 1,567 in 2006, and the annual number of convictions because of 
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continued residence by undesirable aliens increased from 480 to 848 in this period 
(Laagland et al. 2009).  
It is unknown to what extent administrative detention is effective in deterring 
illegal residence. On the one hand, we know that administratively detained migrants in 
the Netherlands are substantially less satisfied about being imprisoned than regular 
prisoners. Moreover, it appears that the elevated level of deprivation in the immigration 
detention regime is among the principal reasons for the reduced level of detention 
satisfaction. This conclusion is based on the prison and immigration detention surveys 
that were conducted by the Ministry of Justice in 2004 and 2007.
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 Our secondary 
analyses show that the difference in imprisonment satisfaction between immigration 
detention centres and regular prisons is most marked for males. On an ordinal scale of 1 
to 5, males in immigration detention centres rated their general satisfaction with the 
institution with an average of 2.1 (2004 and 2007 combined), against 3.0 for regular 
prisoners (2007) (See Figure 2). For women, these figures were 2.7 and 3.1 respectively. 
Similarly, we find that a significantly elevated percentage of administratively detained 
females – and even more so for male detainees – reported having felt unsafe while being 
detained (Figure 3). These gender differences are consistent with the fact that the 
detention regime for administratively detained women is less restrictive than for their 
male counterparts. For instance, female detainees are less likely then male detainees to 
share a cell with more than one person, and more likely to have access to a shower of 
their own.
10
 Moreover, in some centres for women, the detainees are allowed to do their 
own cooking and have their children with them. 
The differences between immigration detention and regular detention tend to be 
most pronounced for precisely the dimensions of detention satisfaction where 
administrative detention centres are objectively outperformed by regular prisons (see the 
dimensions ‘quality of activities’, and ‘ability to enjoy oneself’ in Figure 2; see note for 
details on the scales as there is even reason to think that the scores on ‘quality of 




On the other hand, there is no evidence that unwanted migrants are leaving the 
Netherlands in large numbers because of increased detention and expulsion risks. The 
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most recent study on the size of illegal residence in the Netherlands found a decrease in 
the number of illegal migrants between 2002 and 2005, but attributed that finding mainly 
to the EU’s expansion in 2004 (Van der Heijden et al. 2006).   
 
5. Managing the external effects of poverty 
  
In the Netherlands, illegal migrants are excluded from formal welfare arrangements and 
(most) health care, since the Koppelingswet (‘Linking Act’) was implemented in 1998. 
As a consequence, illegal migrants who stay in the Netherlands in spite of its increasingly 
restrictive policies with regard to illegal residence have become dependent on informal 
social safety nets in case of unemployment, homelessness and/or illness. Moreover, the 
aforementioned restrictive policies also seem to increase the extent to which illegal 
migrants come to depend on relief as such: illegal migrants’ labour market and housing 
market position deteriorated as a consequence of the Koppelingswet and other restrictive 
measures.
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 This policy-driven increase in social exclusion appears to have resulted in 
more marginalisation and a rise in (petty) crime among illegal migrants in the 
Netherlands (Leerkes 2009; Leerkes and Bernasco, 2010).  
In spite of this restrictive legal framework, and partly because of it, substantial 
numbers of illegal migrants manage to be supported by non-governmental organisations. 
A 2002 case study in The Hague and Leiden revealed that there was considerable 
solidarity with illegal migrants at the local level (Rusinovic et al. 2002; Van der Leun 
2003). A highly varied group of churches, civil initiatives, migrant organisations, left-
wing activists and civil servants expressed support for illegal migrants. These institutions 
and individuals tended to specialise in the support they offered. Some donated meals, 
while others gave legal advice or information about health care, arranged temporary 
accommodation, or offered language courses. 
Interestingly, local governments – faced with the results of restrictive immigration 
policy in the form of homeless and criminal illegal migrants on their streets – have also 
begun to offer relief to specific categories of illegal migrants. For instance, many 
municipalities subsidise accommodation or have begun to organise accommodation 
themselves. According to an inventory by the VNG, the association of Dutch 
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municipalities, 170 of the approximately 400 municipalities offered such support in direct 
or indirect ways, from which more than 2,000 persons benefited (Van der Leun 2004). 
Such municipal support is largely aimed at asylum seekers whose applications have been 
turned down. 
Yet these local networks are quite loose and unorganised. Each of the individuals 
and organisations involved tries to take care of a small part of the demand. Moreover, not 
every applicant can be helped, as resources are limited. The organisations have to be 
selective and are forced to set criteria determining who may or may not be helped. The 
old distinction between the deserving poor and undeserving poor tends to return under 
these circumstances. Rejected asylum seekers, i.e. refugees, have a greater chance of 
being helped than other groups of illegal migrants such as ‘economic adventurers’. This 
is the case with municipal support, but also for support by churches. Women and children 
are helped more often than single men. 
Thus, there is a growing group of vulnerable illegal migrants in the Netherlands, 
composed of people who cannot find sufficient employment, do not have a family or 
partner to support them, and are to a great extent excluded from the informal social safety 
nets that NGO’s and municipalities have developed. They are increasingly declared 
undesirable aliens due to repeated illegal residence, more or less serious criminal 
activities, or a combination of the two. The size of this group is unknown, but is believed 
to vary between several hundred and several thousand individuals. They are mostly, but 
not exclusively, adult males. 
A considerable number of the members of this group are difficult to expel, 
because, as has been said, they manage to keep their identities secret, but also in part 
because countries of origin appear to be reluctant to take such marginalised illegal 
migrants back. They are also less likely to be granted residence rights under legalisation 
programmes which tend, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, to exclude migrants who have 
been convicted of crimes. Set against the background of previous regularisations in the 
Netherlands – there have been a few regularisations, but these were limited and 
politically contested – this group’s chances for regularisation are negligible.   
For these reasons, we hypothesise that detention – criminal detention as well as 
immigration detention – may also be used as a form of ‘relief of last resort’ for such 
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strongly marginalised illegal migrants. The aforementioned forms of crime and public 
order disturbances generate anxieties  among the established population, but are often not 
serious enough to lead to criminal imprisonment. In the general population such forms of 
deviance, such as homelessness, are often taken care of by social workers, or by means of 
granting unemployment benefits, but for illegal migrants that is increasingly impossible. 
As will be elaborated below, our research suggests that the authorities as well as 
marginalised illegal migrants themselves contribute to the use of detention as a form of 
poor relief, albeit for different reasons. The authorities, including local policemen, use 
detention to relieve public order disturbances that are associated with immigrant 
pauperism. Seen from this perspective, it is noteworthy that the Dutch Expulsion Centres 
in Rotterdam and at Schiphol airport were introduced under the banner of a government 
program that was called ‘Towards a safer society’(Den Hollander 2004: 160). And a 
recent report by the Ministry of Justice (2009: 9) describes its program ‘expelling / 
detaining’ as follows: “[a]ll efforts are aimed at expelling criminal and/or nuisance-
causing illegals, and, if that is not yet possible ... to detain them in order to take away the 
nuisance for society”. In other words, it seems that Dutch authorities increasingly use 
immigration detention (and criminal detention) for incapacitation purposes, and not only 
as a measure of immigration policy.  
 
We have already mentioned the increased average length of stay in administrative 
detention and the common use of ‘cobbling’, which may lead to repeated administrative 
detention. These practices may be the result of the informal function of deterring illegal 
residence, but are also consistent with the interpretation that administrative detention is 
used to relieve pauperism and its external effects. During our own fieldwork in the 
Immigration Detention Centre in Tilburg, which was conducted in 2005, we also found 
qualitative support for the latter hypothesis (for details on this fieldwork see Leerkes 
2009). Several of the 26 men who were interviewed – only men who had been convicted 
of crimes in the Netherlands were selected for an interview – turned out to have been in 
immigration detention more than once. The clergymen and psychologists working in the 
institution turned out to know some of them quite well from previous stays. Institution 
staff members also told us that undesirable aliens are sometimes put in immigration 
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detention by the police in the big cities during special festivities in town such as 
Koninginnedag, the national celebration of the Dutch queen’s birthday. 
 Strongly marginalised illegal migrants, on their part, sometimes seem to ‘use’ 
detention – this goes for criminal detention and immigration detention – as a temporary 
relief for their lives outside of the detention centre. Most illegal migrants whom we 
interviewed found immigration detention a difficult and denigrating experience, which 
reflects the reduced level of detention satisfaction in administrative detention (Figure 2). 
At the same time, some respondents judged it less negatively. An undesirable alien from 
Iran, who had for years been part of a group of street drug-users in a deprived 
neighbourhood in Amsterdam, claimed that he sometimes pleaded guilty to offences he 
had not committed in order to recover in detention from his life on the streets. Staff 
members also claimed that detainees sometimes preferred a stay in immigration detention 
to life on the streets. Reputedly there was even a case where a detainee who had been 
cobbled because no laissez passer could be obtained, set up camp in the bushes next to 
the institution.  
The latter impression may also be confirmed by Figure 2. Note that the difference 
in detention satisfaction between administrative and criminal detention is relatively small 
or non-existent for aspects of detention that may be related to poor relief (material 
aspects, hygiene, health care).  It may also be that women, in particular, find relief and 
protection in centres for immigration detention. 
In some respects, these practices share similarities with the poorhouses of the 
past, particularly the earliest variants such as the houses of correction or workhouses. The 
latter institutions were also meant to control the external effects of pauperism and were 
similarly characterised by a strong measure of social control and repression (Katz 1986; 
Wagner 2005). The current detention practices, however, are directed at aliens, at 
‘outsiders’, and not at insiders. Contrary to the poor houses of the past, the present 
detention centres are not supposed to reform and discipline ‘idle’ illegal migrants into 
labour. Rather, they are kept off the streets as much as possible. This difference may also 
explain why labour is not mandatory in immigration detention. 
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In short, it appears that immigration detention has become a system of control that 
incapacitates marginal populations, while ideas of rehabilitation and correction disappear 
into the background. This is in line with the new penology hypothesis. 
 
6. Managing popular anxiety and symbolically asserting state control 
 
International migration – especially migration from poorer non-EU countries – has 
become a highly politicised topic throughout Europe, including the Netherlands. While 
considerable parts of the established population continue to press for more restrictive 
policies, other groups advocate a more liberal migration regime. After years of intense 
debate the Dutch government regularised about 30,000 rejected asylum seekers in 2008. 
In general, however, public opinion in the Netherlands has become increasingly negative 
towards migration from poorer non-EU countries since at least the mid 1990s. 
Social surveys provide clear indications of an increasingly negative public 
opinion regarding immigration from non-Western countries, especially for the period in 
which immigration detention increased the most. The European Social Survey (ESS), 
which has been carried out four times since 2002, includes the question to what extent 
‘migrants from poorer countries outside Europe should be allowed [to live in the 
country]’. In 2002, 43% of the Dutch respondents (N=2,364) answered ‘a few’ or ‘none’. 
In 2004 (N=1,881) and 2006 (N=1,889) that share increased to 47% and 53%. 
Interestingly, in 2008 that percentage had returned to the 2002 level (43%, N=1,778), 
paralleling the political decision to legalise about 30,000 rejected asylum seekers and the 
decreased use of administrative immigration detention after 2006 (Figure 1). Additional 
indications for a negative public opinion towards (illegal) immigration can be found in 
the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). As part of the ISSP, two representative 
surveys on ‘national identities’ were carried out, in 1995 and 2003 respectively. In 1995, 
37% of the Dutch respondents (N=1,823) agreed or agreed strongly that immigrants 
increase crime rates. In 2003 this percentage had gone up to 45% (N=2,089). Also, in 
1995 a large majority (81%) agreed or agreed strongly that the government should take 
stronger measures to exclude illegal migrants. In 2003 this percentage remained 
unchanged, even though the Dutch government had in fact taken several measures 
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between 1995 and 2003 to curb illegal residence. Thus, public pressure on the 
government to ‘do something’ about illegal migration clearly persisted in the face of an 
increasingly restrictive policy towards illegal migrants.   
 
It is against this background of popular opinion that we hypothesise that immigration 
detention is not only intended to facilitate expulsion (the formal framework for 
immigration detention) and migration decisions (our hypothesis about immigration 
detention’s covert function of deterring illegal residence); it also seems to have the 
function to regulate the more abstract social unrest regarding unwanted migration. The 
increase in immigration detention communicates the message that the State is still in 
control over the geographical (and social) borders that citizens want to maintain. 
Admittedly, the poor relief function of administrative detention, which was discussed in 
the previous section, also addresses social unrest to some extent, but social unrest in 
connection with pauperism must be distinguished from the more abstract and generalised 
anxiety about unwanted immigration that concerns us here. This third informal function 
of immigration detention is akin to the function of punishment as denunciation: it 
expresses the value that there should be borders demarcating the divide between who 
belongs to the society and who does not. 
Compared to the other informal functions, the denunciation function may be 
relatively latent, i.e. relevant actors may not realise – or at least openly admit – that 
immigration detention is functional for denunciation. For this reason, empirical evidence 
is bound to remain somewhat speculative.  
It is clear, however, that an increase in immigration detention is, par excellence, 
useful to appease citizens about unwanted migration: detention symbolises social 
exclusion in a straightforward way. Bosworth (quoted in Lee 2007: 850) puts it as 
follows: ‘[t]he point is that prisons and detention centers … are singularly useful in the 
management of non-citizens because they provide both a physical and a symbolic 
exclusion zone’. Zygmunt Bauman also characterises modern prisons as ‘factories of 
exclusion’ and links them with political reactions to popular sentiments:  “To posit 
imprisonment as the crucial strategy in the fight for citizen’s safety means addressing the 
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issue in a contemporary idiom, using language readily understood and invoking 
commonly familiar experience” (Bauman 1998: 121). 
Foucault (1977) is well-known for his argument that pre-modern punishments 
symbolised and glorified the political power of the Monarch. If we are right, immigration 
detention is – albeit to a more limited extent and with a more modern dramaturgy – being 
used to symbolise the power of the national State in times of heightened globalisation. In 
that respect, it is interesting to note that centres for immigration detention – especially the 
more punitive regimes for men – are spatially overrepresented in the Randstad, the 
densely populated Western part of the Netherlands. In contrast to this, reception centres 
for asylum seekers – which send a different message as asylum seekers may be admitted 
to the Netherlands – tend to be located in sparsely populated areas.13 Moreover, it appears 
that most centres for immigration detention symbolise departure in one way or another. 
Several centres are located near airports (Schiphol and Rotterdam airport). Admittedly, 
this may be practical with an eye to expulsion. Yet, other centres are located near 
harbours (Rotterdam and Dordrecht), even if no expulsions are carried out by sea. In 
addition, in recent years several centres for immigration detention have been built in the 
form of detention boats (Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Zaandam). The official reason for the 
construction of these boats was that it was a quick way to increase the detention capacity, 
but this raises the question of whether there were no other ways to do so, for instance by 
building centres in less populated areas, and why no detention boats were built to 
accommodate the increased need for criminal detention capacity. The boats are now 
being closed, partly in response to a report by Amnesty International (2008), which 
criticised the human rights situation on the boats, and because of the recent decrease in 
the number of detained illegal migrants as a consequence of the EU-enlargements. 
There is a final indication for the denunciation function of immigration detention: 
whereas the expansion of immigration detention capacity was quite well-communicated 
to the public, information on expulsion trends is certainly not.
14
 The latter information is, 
as we mentioned in section 3, deeply buried in Ministry of Justice reports, which are not 
characterised by a very transparent presentation of expulsion figures, to say the least.     
  
6. Discussion: mixed motives for administrative immigration detention? 
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Immigrant detention in the Netherlands indeed constitutes a case of mixed motives. Its 
formal function is still firmly upheld, but does not explain detention practices completely. 
It has to be said though, that EU member states, including the Netherlands, have been 
investing heavily in the construction of new biometric identification systems to ‘break 
down the anonymity’ of illegal migrants (see Broeders 2007, 2009). This may strengthen 
the formal function by increasing the number and speed of successful expulsions.  
Three informal functions have been discussed: (1) deterring illegal residence, (2) 
controlling pauperism and (3) symbolically asserting state control. There is an elective 
affinity between the functions mentioned. In many cases the functions need, and 
reinforce, each other. For example, in order to address social unrest about unwanted 
immigration, expulsions should occur, and immigration detention should try to deter 
illegal residence, but it also helps if nuisance-causing illegal migrants are kept of the 
street. There is, however, a tension between expulsion, deterrence and the management of 
popular anxiety on the one hand, and poor relief on the other hand. If administrative 
detention becomes too ‘comfortable’ the incentive to co-operate with repatriation is 
greatly reduced, and the general public will not be convinced that the state is in control 
over unwanted migration. If, however, immigration detention becomes too harsh, it will 
give cause for humanitarian objections, but will also worsen health and behavioural 
problems among ‘cobbled’ detainees, thus giving rise to more public order problems and 
more public anxiety about immigration. For this reason, it is likely that a certain balance 
between punitive and more humanitarian concerns is and will be considered necessary. 
The informal functions mentioned have, in part, developed in relation to the 
phenomenon of the ‘undeportable deportable alien’. This suggests that the institution of 
immigration detention, like immigration policy in general, is in flux: modern society has 
not yet found a definitive solution for the presence of migrants who are formally not 
admitted, but are also difficult to expel. Mixed motives for administrative detention are to 
some extent the result of different actors – state authorities, local authorities, citizens, 
illegal migrants – using detention for their own purposes.  
 There are clear analogies between the three informal functions of immigration 
detention and the functions of  punishment described by the academic literature. Firstly, 
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there is deterrence in immigration detention, even if it is aimed at influencing migration 
decisions rather than at deterring criminality as usually defined. Secondly, there is 
incapacitation, even if illegal migrants qualify for incapacitation more easily than citizens 
and legal denizens, where minor offences and pauperism usually do not lead prolonged 
periods of detention. Thirdly, there is denunciation, though not primarily in connection 
with social values that obtain regardless of legal status – this tends to be more typical of 
criminal law - but rather in connection with values that are specifically related to 
‘unwanted’ outsiders, expressing the condemnation of immigration and residence  
without the consent of the body politic. 
These analogies question the seemingly clear-cut division between criminal and 
administrative law. In this connection, our analysis confirms De Giorgi’s (2006: 133) 
claims that practices of detention and expulsion of immigrants are ‘formally 
administrative’ yet ‘concretely penal’, an opinion that is echoed in Ericson’s (2007: 25) 
notion of ‘counter law’ in which “the traditional distinctions between the different legal 
forms of criminal, civil and administrative law” have become blurred. We have shown 
that there also is a blurring between different types of administrative law in so far as 
immigration detention regulates pauperism, which, in the legal population, is not 
controlled by detention to the same extent, and is usually dealt with under administrative 
law (rules about access to public homeless shelters, unemployment benefits).   
The analogies raise the question of why immigrant detention is not integrated in 
criminal law, and why it tends to be dealt with under administrative law even in countries 
where illegal residence is defined as a crime (such as Germany). We propose that the 
explanation lies in two aspects of punishment that are less central in immigration 
detention. Firstly, the full incorporation in criminal law risks being at odds with the sense 
of justice and proportionality that underlies notions of punishment as retribution. A 
detention lasting three, six or even eighteen months on account of the ‘mere’ crime of 
illegal residence would contrast strongly with the major – for example violent – crimes 
usually leading to such a (lengthy) sentence. It would bring illegal residence into a 
‘league’ of crime where it does not belong according to most citizens, but especially in 
the eyes of criminal judges, academics, human rights organisations, and advocacy groups. 
In this sense, administrative law provides the authorities with a flexible instrument of 
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control (in terms of length of detention) that would probably be difficult to obtain under 
criminal law. If immigration detention would be completely transferred to the latter body 
of law, Western societies would have to admit that different standards of punishment and 
governmental control pertain to citizens and (unwanted) non-citizens (see also Walters 
2002, Sayad 2004). In the legal and official policy discourse, this difference remains 
more hidden and implicit (cf. Bosworth, 2007). 
A second obstacle to incorporating illegal residence into criminal law is that it would 
necessitate the application of a reintegration ideology for offenders committing the 
‘crime’ of illegal residence. Dutch penitentiary law, for example, stipulates that the 
penitentiary program is supposed to increase the chances of involvement in the regular 
labour market after release. Such ideals of reformation, even if less pronounced now than 
a few decades ago, would contradict the official objective of expulsion that is inherent in 
the legal construction of an ‘illegal alien’. Whereas a ‘deviant’ citizen is supposed to 
have opportunity to re-earn the status of a ‘normal’ citizen (this is true for convicts and 
for other institutionalized groups, such as drug addicts and psychiatric patients), detained 
illegal migrants are supposed to leave the (national) society, even if it would be possible 
and – in the case of criminal illegal migrants – deemed necessary to reform the detainee. 
(It is conceivable that penitentiary programs would assist reintegration in the country of 
origin rather than in the country of detention, but so far this is not happening.)  
In the future we may see a greater de facto and de jure differentiation in 
immigration detention. Some informal punitive aspects may become integrated in 
criminal law, for example by making repeated illegal residence a punishable offense. At 
the same time, less punitive aspects may be organised in a system of control that is less 
modelled after criminal detention. While ‘undeserving’ illegal migrants – i.e. male illegal 
migrants, criminal illegal migrants, illegal migrants not co-operating with expulsion – are 
likely to be criminalised further (not only de facto, but also de jure), their ‘deserving’ 
counterparts may become decriminalised to a greater extent. Should such a development 
materialise, that would not be the first time in the history of the prison that institutional 
differentiation occurred: from the houses of correction, for instance, grew both the 
modern prison and the more humanitarian poor house (cf. Morris and Rothman 1998). 
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There are, in fact, a number of indications that this differentiation is already 
underway, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere. We already mentioned the gender 
difference in immigration detention regimes in the Netherlands and pointed at the 
increase in the number of aliens that are declared undesirable. Besides this, it is relevant 
to note that in 2006 the Dutch government started an experiment with what is called an 
onderdaklocatie (‘shelter location’). In this open centre, where clients can stay a 
maximum of twelve weeks, illegal migrants are not detained but nonetheless controlled: 
they have to report themselves to the authorities regularly. Tellingly, the institution is 
reserved for rejected asylum seekers who no longer have a right to stay in the 
Netherlands and are believed to be willing to co-operate with ‘voluntary return’. 
Furthermore, in December 2009 a one year experiment was started with a nationally 
funded centre for the temporary relief of rejected asylum seekers who are seriously ill, 
and who have not yet managed to obtain a temporary residence permit on that ground. 
Likewise, in the United States, after complaints by civil liberties and immigrant advocacy 
groups (see Amnesty International 2009), the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) has recently declared its intentions to hold ‘non-criminal immigrants [our 
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Figure 1: Administrative detention and expulsions in the Netherlands, 1999-
2007 
 
Source: Detention capacity 1999-2002 from DJI (2004), detention capacity data 2003-
2007 from DJI (2008a). Data on number of detainees on September 30th from Statistics 
Netherlands, http://statline.cbs.nl (visited October 2009). Data on expulsions 1999-2001 
from  Immigration and Naturalisation Service (cited by Autonoom Centrum (2004)); data 
on expulsions 2002-2004 from Ministry of Justice (2005), expulsions 2005 from Ministry 
of Justice (2006), expulsions 2006 (Ministry of Justice 2007: 42), expulsions 2007 
Ministry of Justice (2008a: 21, 2008b: 19).  
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Figure 2: Detention satisfaction among administratively detained illegal migrants 
(2004 and 2007 combined) and regular prisoners (2007) by sex 
 
 
Source: DJI Vreemdelingensurvey 2004, DJI Vreemdelingensurvey 2007, and DJI 
Gedetineerdensurvey 2007.   
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Figure 3. Feelings of unsafety among administratively detained illegal migrants 
(2004 and 2007 combined) and regular prisoners (2007) by sex 
 
Source: DJI Vreemdelingensurvey 2004, DJI Vreemdelingensurvey 2007, and DJI 
Gedetineerdensurvey 2007.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Dutch Alien Law 2000, clause 59. 
2 Detention may also be annulled when immigration authorities anticipate that an administrative 
judge will decide to annul, or when the acting immigration officer considers continued detention 
unlawful. 
3 Research by Van Kalmthout and Van Leeuwen (2004: 60) suggested that at least 29 per cent of 
the administratively detained migrants have been detained repeatedly. The authors base this on 
the checklist used by the government to record information about the alien, filled in by the local 
aliens police. Out of 329 respondents who were researched by Van Kalmthout and Van Leeuwen, 
95 respondents (29 per cent) had been previously presented, thirteen respondents (4 per cent) 
had not and there were no data available for 221 respondents (67 per cent). Repeated immigration 
detention is allowed if a year has expired after a former period of detention has ended, or if new 
facts or circumstances occur that may lead to expulsion.   
4  Germany, Finland , Ireland, France, Cyprus, and, since 2009, Italy. 
5 Source for 1994 figure: Statistics Netherlands, http://statline.cbs.nl, visited January 2010. 
Source 2006 figure: Dienst Justititiële Inrichtingen, http://www.dji.nl, visited April 2010.  
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6  Source: http://www.dji.nl, visited April 2010. 
7 In 2007, the average costs for immigration detention per place per day were 155 euro, against 
197 euro in regular prisons (DJI, 2008: 61). 
8 Before becoming a cabinet minister, Mr. Nawijn had a career in the Dutch civil service at the 
department of Justice. He held various positions in the field of immigration policy, lastly as 
director of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND).   
9 In 2004 622 illegal migrants participated in the survey, and in 2007 575; in 2007 the number of 
respondents in regular prisons was 6,020. We are thankful to the National Agency of Correctional 
Institution's (DJI) for making the data available to us in order to conduct secondary analyses. 
10About two third (68%) of the administratively detained females who participated in the 
Vreemdelingensurvey 2004 or Vreemdelingensurvey 2007 had a shower in their cell. against 
halve (51%) of the males. About a quarter of the females (24%) had to share a cell with more than 
one person, against 46% of the males. 
11 The scale ‘material situation’ (Cronbach’s alpha=.74; listwise missing = 14%) is the average of 
the scores for the items ‘I get enough to eat’, ‘I am satisfied about the quality of the products in the 
shop’, ‘I can buy in the shop what I need’, ‘Warm food has the right temperature’, ‘I am satisfied 
about the eating times’, ‘I think the warm food is tasty’, ‘They take religious beliefs into account 
for the meals’. The scale ‘hygiene’ (alpha=.71; listwise missing = 11%) is the average of the scores 
for the items ‘It is clean on my unit’, ‘The showers are clean’, ‘the air space is clean’, ‘I can get my 
clothes cleaned sufficiently regularly’, ‘I can shower sufficiently regularly’. The scale ‘health care’ 
(alpha=.73; listwise missing = 18%) is the average of the scores for the items ‘I have been well-
informed in this institution about contagious diseases (such a STD’s, aids, jaundice)’, ‘I can get 
tested easily (for example for aids and hepatitis) if I want to’, ‘If I want to I can go to the doctor in 
this institution’, ‘I am satisfied about the work of the doctor’, ‘I am satisfied about the work of the 
nurse’. The scale ‘quality of activities’ (=.79; listwise missing = 21%) is the average of the scores 
for the items ‘I am satisfied about the sporting facilities’, ‘I am satisfied about the library’,  ‘I am 
satisfied about labour facilities’, ‘I am satisfied about creative facilities’. It is probable that 
administratively detained migrant are even more negative about the quality of activities than the 
scores on this scale suggest. For this scale the number of missing values among the latter 
migrants is quite high (35%), which may be due to the fact that several administratively detained 
respondents did not have access to labour and creative facilities. The scale ‘ability to enjoy oneself’ 
(alpha=.75; listwise missing = 18%) is the average of the scores for the items ‘I can enjoy myself in 
my cell’, ‘I can spend my free time with things that I like’, ‘In the evenings I have enough to do’. 
The scale ‘relations with staff’ (alpha=.86; listwise missing = 14%) is the average of the scores for 
the items ‘The personnel will help me if I have problems’, ‘The personnel are friendly to me’, ‘If I 
am down, I can talk with the personnel’, ‘The personnel treat me in a normal way’. 
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12 In 1991, for instance, the use of social-security numbers was barred for illegal migrants, which 
made it much more difficult for them to work in the formal economy. In 2005, the fine for 
employers who hired illegal aliens was raised from 900 to 8,000 euro per employee, and since the 
late 1990s the government increasingly allocated resources to enforce employer sanctions.  
13 The latter centres are often located in out of the way places, on industrial zones or in abandoned 
military complexes; this is also done to discourage societal integration in light of the fact that the 
majority of the asylum claims will be rejected. 
14 The government’s press release of November 5th 2004, which highlights the results of the 
Ministry’s of Justuce report Rapportage Vreemdelingenketen 2004, periode mei tot en met 
augustus, is a fairly typical example (see 
http://www.regering.nl/Actueel/Pers_en_nieuwsberichten/2004/November/05/Rapportage_in
stroom_asielzoekers_daalt.). The press release starts with stressing the decrease in the number of 
migrants applying for political asylum (in the period May-August 2004 there were 34% fewer 
applications compared to the same period in 2003). Later on, the release mentions the increase in 
the capacity for administrative immigration detention and also lists the number of deported 
illegal migrants in the period May-August 2004. The release does not - contrary to the figures on 
asylum applications - mention that the number of expulsions decreased since 2003.  
15 Source: Washington Post, August 7, 2009. 
